I come to the issue of baby markets with reservations. Drawing on a relational conception of autonomy and self-definition, I argue that commodification of reproductive material is intrinsically harmful. Moreover, such commodification poses a number of consequential harms. Nevertheless, in spite of these concerns, I “give in” to baby markets, which is to say I do not argue for the prohibition of these markets, but instead for their regulation and oversight. In other words, I am not willing to accept completely free and unfettered markets. I give in to baby markets in part because of the great impracticality of prohibiting markets given how well entrenched they are. In addition, although markets present risks, the risk–benefit calculus calls for allowing markets to exist, provided there is careful and serious regulation of such markets. Thus I take a pragmatic approach that suggests we should (reluctantly) accept baby markets as long as we offer measures to counteract the negative effects of commodification so that baby markets work equitably, safely, and in a way that protects the interests of all involved: seller, buyer, and future child. In a country with limited regulation of the reproductive industry, this may be a tall order.

In section A of this chapter, I use a relational theory of personhood to suggest that reproductive material can be relationally self-defining to varying degrees. The more self-defining such material is, the more intrinsically harmful it is to buy and sell it.