So far, states that are party to the Statute have willingly supported the ICC, but the Court's most vigorous supporters fret that the states are not dedicated enough to its effectiveness. States' views differ on how interventionist they should be in the operations of the Court, recognizing that its judicial operations must appear free from political influence. But given the leadership problems inherent in the tripartite structure of the Court and statutory ambiguity about the role of the Assembly of States Parties, ICC proponents argue that the states could condemn the Court to irrelevance if they don't more vigorously promote further accessions to the Statute, more actively engage in charting the Court's future, and much more energetically provide cooperation in the investigation and arrests of suspects.

Acutely aware the states are watching them, Court officials strive to convey images of judicial seriousness, procedural excellence, and administrative efficiency. But a sneaking fear persists that without much greater state involvement, the ICC's ability to bring suspects to the Court and try them will prove inadequate to the task of retaining states' financial and political support. This realization may be what motivated the Prosecutor initially to point out that the Court's success will be found partly in broader undertakings than just trials, for instance in a decline of impunity due to domestic prosecutions promoted by the ICC. The OTP is, however, under great pressure from states, NGOs, and Chambers to accelerate the pace of investigations, requests for warrants, and moves toward trials.