Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-8kt4b Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-07T05:04:45.746Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - Do self-regulation clubs work? Some evidence from Europe and some caveats from economic theory

from Part II - Club sponsorship and club design

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2010

Mary Kay Gugerty
Affiliation:
University of Washington
Aseem Prakash
Affiliation:
University of Washington
Get access

Summary

We also wanted to make sure there was transparency in the donation system. People must know where their money goes and what it's really spent for.

(Pavlína Kalousová, executive director of the Czech Donors Forum)

Quality assurance for goods and services relies often on direct reputations, or indirect reputations provided by ratings systems, certification systems, or self-regulatory programs. (It might also rely on warranties or other more tangible mechanisms.) Ratings systems are involuntary systems established by watchdogs that rate the sellers in a particular market according to some set of criteria or standards. The sellers typically do not take part in the definition of the set of standards, or in the evaluation of their performance in meeting these standards, and thus ratings programs are not voluntary programs. In contrast, various certification systems (e.g., ISO 9000, ISO 14001, Fair Trade coffee, organic certification, or certification systems for charitable organizations) and various self-regulatory programs rely on voluntary participation, at least on the part of those that are certified or take part in such programs. Thus the incentives facing both the designers and the participants in these systems will differ. Complementing our previous work on certification systems (e.g., Ortmann and Svítková, 2007), here we ponder the relative advantages of the competing forms that voluntary participation can take, particularly among nonprofit organizations. Befitting the title of the book to which our chapter contributes, we look at a particular case of a nonprofit accountability club of sorts.

Type
Chapter
Information
Voluntary Regulation of NGOs and Nonprofits
An Accountability Club Framework
, pp. 152 - 168
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Banerjee, A. and Duflo, E.. 2000. Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry. Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3): 989–1017.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bekkers, R. 2003. Trust, Accreditation, and Philanthropy in the Netherlands. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 32(4): 596–615.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bekkers, R. 2006. The Benefits of Accreditation for Fundraising Nonprofits. Accessed via www.cbf.nl/Downloads/Bestanden/Algemeen/benefits%20of%20accreditation%20artikel%20Rene%20Bekkers.pdf.
Brhlikova, P. 2004. The Nonprofit Sector in the Czech Republic. CERGE-EI Discussion Paper No. 128.
Brhlikova, P. 2007. Essays on Competition and Entrepreneurial Choice between Nonprofit and For-profit Firms. CERGE-EI dissertation. Accessed via www.cerge-ei.cz/publications/dissertations/brhlikova_dissertation.asp.
Chhaochharia, V. and Ghosh, S.. 2008. Do Charity Ratings Matter? Working paper, Florida Atlantic University.
DeMarzo, P. M., Fishman, M. J., and Hagerty, K. M.. 2005. Self-Regulation and Government Oversight. Review of Economic Studies 72(3): 687–706.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Drucker, P. 1992. Managing the Non-Profit Organization. New York: HarperCollins.Google Scholar
Fric, P. and Goulli, R. 2001. Neziskovy sektor v Ceske republice. Prague: Eurolex Bohemia.Google Scholar
Gibelman, M. and Gelman, S. R.. 2004. A Loss of Credibility: Patterns of Wrongdoing among Nongovernmental Organizations. Voluntas 15(5): 355–381.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guet, I. H. 2002. Monitoring Fundraising: A Comparative Survey of ICFO Members and their Countries. Berlin: ICFO.Google Scholar
Kalousová, P. 2007. 10 Questions with … Prague Post. April 20. Accessed via www.the prague post.com/articles/2007/11/21/10-questions.php.
Kalousová, P. 2008. Contribute to Charity. Prague Post. January 3. Accessed via www.thepraguepost.com/articles/2008/01/03contribute-to-charity.php.
Klein, B. and Leffler, K.. 1981. The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance. Journal of Political Economy 89(3): 615–641.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kleiner, M. M. 2006. Licensing Occupations: Ensuring Quality or Restricting Competition?Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kreps, D. M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Maxwell, J., Lyon, T., and Hackett, S.. 2000. Self-Regulation and Social Welfare: The Political Economy of Corporate Environmentalism. Journal of Law and Economics, 43(2): 583–617.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Myslivecek, J. 2008. Comparing Certification and Self-Regulation. Unpublished manuscript.Google Scholar
Nunez, J. 2001. A Model of Self-Regulation. Economics Letters 74(1): 91–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nunez, J. 2007. Can Self Regulation Work?: A Story of Corruption, Impunity and Cover-up. Journal of Regulatory Economics 31(2): 209–233.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortmann, A. 1996. Modern Economic Theory and the Study of Nonprofit Organizations: Why the Twain Shall Meet. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 25(4): 470–484.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortmann, A. 2001. Capital Romance: Why Wall Street Fell in Love with Higher Education. Education Economics 9(3): 293–311.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortmann, A. and Schlesinger, M.. 2003. Trust, Repute, and the Role of Nonprofit Enterprise. In Anheier, H. and Ben-Ner, A., eds. The Study of Nonprofit Enterprise. KluwerAcademic/Plenum, pp. 77–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ortmann, A. and Myslivecek, J.. 2010. Certification and Self-Regulation of Non-Profits, and the Institutional Choice between Them. In Seaman, B. and Young, D., eds. Handbook of Research on Nonprofit Economics and Management. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 280–290.Google Scholar
Ortmann, A. and Svítková, K. 2007. Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism in Transition Economies: Evidence, Theory, and Open Questions. Prague Economic Papers 16: 99–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pospisil, M. 2006. Mapping the Czech Nonprofit Sector. Civil Review 3(3–4): 233–244.Google Scholar
Potoski, M. and Prakash, A.. 2005a. Covenants with Weak Swords: 14001 and Facilities' Environmental Performance. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 24(4): 745–769.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Potoski, M., and Prakash, A.. 2005b. Green Clubs and Voluntary Governance: ISO 14001 and Firms' Regulatory Compliance. American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 235–248.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Shaked, A. and Sutton, J.. 1981. The Self-Regulating Profession. Review of Economic Studies 48(2): 217–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stefanadis, C. 2003. Self-Regulation, Innovation, and the Financial Industry. Journal of Regulatory Economics 23(1): 5–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Svítková, K. and Ortmann, A.. 2006. Certification as a Viable Quality Assurance Mechanism: Theory and Suggestive Evidence. CERGE-EI Working Paper No. 288.
Tirole, J. 1996. A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality). The Review of Economic Studies 63(1): 1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tirole, J. 2006. The Theory of Corporate Finance. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Wilke, B. 2005. Transparenz im Spendenwesen: Siegel, Selbstregulierung, Watchdogs. Ein Vergleich USA, Grossbritannien und Deutschland. In Walz, W. R., Koetz, H., Rawert, P., and Schmidt, K., eds. Non-Profit Law Yearbook 2004. Calogne: Carl Heymans Verlag, pp. 181–206.Google Scholar

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×