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Bibliography

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 June 2012

Roger D. Blair  and
Jeffrey L. Harrison
Roger D. Blair
Affiliation:
University of Florida
Jeffrey L. Harrison
Affiliation:
University of Florida
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Monopsony in Law and Economics , pp. 233 - 244
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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