Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Part I A constructionist framework for person and self
- Part II Person and self in science
- 8 Philosophy's legacy to a science of self
- 9 Self in mind and brain
- 10 Self, person as agent and natural causation
- 11 Self in child development
- 12 Self in human evolution
- 13 Loose ends and split hairs
- Bibliography
- Index
13 - Loose ends and split hairs
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 August 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Part I A constructionist framework for person and self
- Part II Person and self in science
- 8 Philosophy's legacy to a science of self
- 9 Self in mind and brain
- 10 Self, person as agent and natural causation
- 11 Self in child development
- 12 Self in human evolution
- 13 Loose ends and split hairs
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
I will now return to some of the theoretical issues I raised in Chapter 1 and review them in the light of arguments presented in the intervening chapters. The issues are complex and unresolved. This chapter is a set of ‘loose ends’ rather than a list of tidy conclusions. I will focus on what I consider to be the leading issues. The first of these is the problem of locating persons and selves within levels and types of explanation. The second is to consider whether a dynamic-systems perspective and the concept of emergence offer a solution to this problem. I will then go on to discuss some of the finer points of using words such as ‘fiction’, ‘illusion’ and ‘virtual’ in relation to self. Finally, I comment on the way authors have historicised the self and worried about its future.
Explaining persons within levels
It is difficult to produce a view of persons that integrates all three levels of explanation that I have identified: the sub-personal, the personal and the supra-personal. My aim was to bring them together in a common framework for the natural and social sciences. It is at the personal level that explanations are most familiar. Personists refer to personal attributes such as holding beliefs, acting on desires and making rational plans for the future, but there is a problem in relating this kind of discourse to causal theories.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Virtual Selves, Real PersonsA Dialogue across Disciplines, pp. 267 - 313Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009