Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-wg55d Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-05-01T13:39:56.577Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Epilogue: Three Secular Trends of Corporate Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 August 2010

F. Scott Kieff
Affiliation:
George Washington University, Washington DC
Troy A. Paredes
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Get access

Summary

I feel a little bit like I'm Huck Finn at my own funeral. I've never heard so many kind words, and it's been deeply moving. I've had to pinch myself occasionally to remember I'm still alive. I do want to note, for the record, that while I'm becoming a university president, I'm still going to play a role in securities law. This has been my life as a scholar since I began many years ago, and I'm looking forward particularly to working with Troy Paredes on the fourth edition of the Securities Regulation treatise, what will now be the Loss, Seligman, and Paredes treatise.

The greatest joy of my academic life has been my friends. To see the number of colleagues in this room is especially moving. Harvey Goldschmid, for example, whom I met my first day on the job in August of 1974 at a conference that Elliot Weiss helped organize, provides a sense of continuity for my entire career.

Since the purpose of this conference is to reflect on the new corporate law, let me offer a few thoughts on where we are going by addressing three secular trends, which in the decades to come will have a good deal to do with the development of corporate governance standards.

The first general trend of corporate governance has been the growing irrelevance of state corporate law. This trend dates back decades. It is a study in abdication.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Loss, Louis, Seligman, Joel, & Paredes, Troy, Securities Regulation 796–98 (4th ed. 2007)
Cox, James D., Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 Colum. L. Rev.1200 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
,Symposium, International Accounting Standards in the Wake of Enron, 28 N.C. J. Int'l. L. & Com. Reg.725 (2003)Google Scholar
Kirby, Charles F., 2000 SEC LEXIS 2681 (SEC Dec. 7, 2000)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×