The time that lapsed until the Six Day War – the lengthy “waiting period” from the marching of the Egyptian Army into Sinai in mid-May until the outbreak of war on June 6, 1967 – dragged on and on. It helped the Israel Air Force in its successful attack on the Egyptian airfields and the ground forces in smashing through Nasser's positions in Sinai. Contrary to the fears of IDF generals, the protracted wait weakened the Egyptians' preparedness while the IDF's capabilities improved steadily, and the snowball effect in the Arab world ruled out any diplomatic settlement. When the time came, Ben-Gurion himself saw no choice but to attack Egypt – but probably would have limited the goals of the war. He offered Dayan his services as political adviser – and was turned down.

Thus, the Six Day War swiftly spread from the Egyptian front, where Defense Minister Dayan's attentions were focused, to Jerusalem and the entire West Bank. The decision to occupy East Jerusalem was adopted by the national emergency government under pressure from Ministers Allon and Begin. Prime Minister Eshkol and Defense Minister Dayan, after having been empowered for this purpose by the defense cabinet, gave prior approval for the occupation of the rest of the West Bank – from Jenin to Nablus and Sheikh Hussein Bridge, and from Shu'afat, east of Jerusalem, and Ramallah to Allenby Bridge (and initially beyond) on the Jordan River.