Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on the contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality
- 3 Reasons: practical and adaptive
- 4 The explanatory role of being rational
- 5 Practical competence and fluent agency
- 6 Practical conditionals
- 7 Authority and second-personal reasons for acting
- 8 Promises, reasons, and normative powers
- 9 Regret and irrational action
- 10 Mackie's motivational argument
- 11 The truth in Ecumenical Expressivism
- 12 Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Bibliography
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 May 2010
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on the contributors
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Intention, belief, and instrumental rationality
- 3 Reasons: practical and adaptive
- 4 The explanatory role of being rational
- 5 Practical competence and fluent agency
- 6 Practical conditionals
- 7 Authority and second-personal reasons for acting
- 8 Promises, reasons, and normative powers
- 9 Regret and irrational action
- 10 Mackie's motivational argument
- 11 The truth in Ecumenical Expressivism
- 12 Voluntarist reasons and the sources of normativity
- Bibliography
- Index
- References
Summary
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- Reasons for Action , pp. 272 - 284Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2009
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