England and the Dutch Provinces joined the Grand Alliance for “reducing the exorbitant power of France” in 1701 with an object that was in essence defensive. They had no positive desire to see a German upon the throne of Spain; but they dreaded French dominion over western Europe and across the Atlantic. England has always felt herself vulnerable through the Low Countries, and both Powers feared the loss of their trade in the Mediterranean and farther afield. The English Parliament, sulking against King William III and tired of war, changed temper the moment Louis XIV seized the barrier fortresses in the Netherlands and a French company acquired the “Asiento”, the right of trading in the Spanish Indies, while Louis's recognizing “King James III”, with all that it implied, roused the nation behind Parliament. In July 1701, Marlborough was at the Hague, arranging the detailed terms of the Alliance, with instructions from King William enjoining him, “in the treaties you shall make, particular regard must be had to the security and improvements of the trade of our kingdoms”. He wrote to Godolphin, “I endeavoured to let the Pensionary [of Holland] see that no treaty of this kind would be acceptable in England, if there were not care taken of the Mediterranean and the West Indies.” Thus, the war of the Spanish Succession, as Professor Seeley reminds us, was the most businesslike of all our eighteenth-century wars; it was waged in the interests of English and Dutch merchants whose trade and livelihood were at stake.