Introduction

The previous chapter makes the case for the predicate being counting as demonstrably core-dependent. But as we have noted in previous chapters, Aristotle mentions a number of other homōnyma that he takes to possess features that are similar to being in respect of counting as examples of core-dependent homonymy. Apart from Aristotle's stock examples of the medical and the healthy, a more complete list of these related homōnyma would have to include things such as nature, friendship, cause, one, and good. As some of these instances of related homonymy have received attention elsewhere, the present chapter aims to focus on just two of those less commented, namely, nature and friendship. The first section of the present chapter is devoted to the examination of the case of physis as exhibiting core-related homonymy. In the case of physis, a strong case may be made that we find not only the relationship of overlapping meanings and definitions, but also a network of causal relations among its various instances. With regard to philia, the situation is somewhat different, as the textual evidence supports core-dependence in respect of related accounts concerning the objects of friendship, but the analysis concerned with finding causal connections among the three kinds is problematic, for reasons that will become clear subsequently. Briefly, what may be suggested at this point in relation to philia is that the instances or kinds of friendship do not exhibit a consistent core-dependent structure, and, so, core-dependence holds partially but not fully.