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4 - The retention of time past

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2010

Nicolas de Warren
Affiliation:
Wellesley College, Massachusetts
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Summary

Ja am liebsten spreche ich selbst über Dinge, die noch nicht erledigt, vielmehr im Fluß begriffen sind.

— Husserl

An indirect approach

Husserl conceived of the ITC lectures as an initiation to the phenomenological problem of time-consciousness, not only for his students, but most of all for himself. As with many of his lecture courses, Husserl develops a path of thinking without any preconceived expectation of where it might lead. As Husserl remarks, “we want to follow [these problems] however far we can. Where we can proceed no further, we at least want to formulate clearly the difficulties and possibilities of interpretation; we want to make clear to ourselves where the genuine problems reside, and how to give them a conclusive formulation” (Hua X, xvii). Such an experimental approach allows Husserl to suspend the demand for conclusive results and polished arguments that a presentation in book form would necessarily have required. As Husserl candidly notes, “where I remain silent as an author I can therefore speak as a teacher [Worüber ich mich als Autor ausschweige, darüber kann ich mich als Lehrer darum doch aussprechen]” (Hua X, xvii). Subsequent writings on time-consciousness remained committed to exploring the “difficulties” and “possibilities of interpretation” that rapidly elevated the theme of time-consciousness to “the most difficult of all phenomenological problems” (Hua X, 276 [286]). Indeed, as discussed in chapter 3, despite significant progress, difficulties originally manifest in Brentano's original association still haunt Husserl's thinking, resurfacing in unexpected form within Husserl's own analysis.

Type
Chapter
Information
Husserl and the Promise of Time
Subjectivity in Transcendental Phenomenology
, pp. 141 - 176
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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