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Appendix: Suggested Reading

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 January 2010

Richard F. Hamilton
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
Holger H. Herwig
Affiliation:
University of Calgary
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Summary

On Wars: General

Archer, Christon, John Ferris, Holger H. Herwig, and T. H. E. Travers. World History of Warfare. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Black, Jeremy. Why Wars Happen. New York: New York University Press, 1998. Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. New York: Free Press, 1988.

Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of Wars and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1995.

Rotberg, Robert I., and Theodore K. Rabb, eds. The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations Go to War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.

Type
Chapter
Information
War Planning 1914 , pp. 257 - 262
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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References

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