In chapter 2 we discussed visions of the self that emphasized the social elements relevant to its constitution. Here we take up a theme that connects orthogonally to that vision, the conception of selves as nothing but a sequence of experiences, acts, traits, and judgments that have a particular form. This view accepts the possibility that the beliefs, attitudes, or dispositions that are part of the self are socially constituted, but concludes that what makes a collection of beliefs, attitudes, or dispositions (located in a single biological body) a self is that the set is structured in certain way, in particular in a narrative form.

I want to examine this view in order to assess its usefulness in the context of a political conception of the self. What we will see is that its usefulness arises not so much from the nature of narrative – the particular structure that defines narrativity and hence purportedly distinguishes so-called selves from non-selves – but from the ability to form narratives (whatever those are). That is, the reflective capacity to interpret the elements of one's life (experiences, beliefs, acts) into a unique and coherent structure is what makes the person who she is, not necessarily the fact that those contents have the shape of a good story.

BACKGROUND

In a wide array of fields in recent years, the claim that selves (or personalities, or persons) count as a single entity only if the elements that constitute them are shaped in the form of a narrative has gained enormous popularity.