It is usually assumed in moral philosophy that a teleological approach, as exemplified by Aristotle's ethics of virtue, and a deontological approach, as heralded by Kant's ethics of duty, are incompatible; either the good or the right, to designate these two major traditions by their emblematic predicates. My purpose in this paper is to show that a theory of action, broadly understood, may provide the appropriate framework of thought within which justice can be done to both the Aristotelian and Kantian, the teleological and deontological moments of morality.

Instead of action, I will use the term praxis, not only out of reverence for Aristotle, but in order to acknowledge human action's complexity and scope, which tend to be overlooked in the so-called ‘analytic philosophy of action’. A broad account of praxis allows one, to my mind, to assign the two moments of morality to two different stages on the trajectory of praxis, and to establish in this way their complimentarity.

Praxis and the Teleological Moment of Morality

We will proceed in the following way: by considering a series of levels on the scale of praxis, and seeing how far we can go with a quasi-Aristotelian concept of aretè, understood as excellence—in such a way that we will be able to identify the point where a quasi-Kantian model of obligation has to prevail. To anticipate our further discussion, I suggest that it is the consideration of violence that imposes such a conversion in the ethical account of praxis.