Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on editors and contributors
- Introduction
- 1 The idea of equality revisited
- 2 Is the idea of purely internal consistency of choice bizarre?
- 3 Science, ethics, and objectivity
- 4 Fallibilism and objectivity: science and ethics
- 5 Might there be external reasons?
- 6 Aristotle on human nature and the foundations of ethics
- 7 A most peculiar institution
- 8 Reflection and confidence
- 9 The shape of a life
- 10 Replies
- Index
8 - Reflection and confidence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Notes on editors and contributors
- Introduction
- 1 The idea of equality revisited
- 2 Is the idea of purely internal consistency of choice bizarre?
- 3 Science, ethics, and objectivity
- 4 Fallibilism and objectivity: science and ethics
- 5 Might there be external reasons?
- 6 Aristotle on human nature and the foundations of ethics
- 7 A most peculiar institution
- 8 Reflection and confidence
- 9 The shape of a life
- 10 Replies
- Index
Summary
Reflection is a pervasive theme of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (ELP), and it plays a predominantly discouraging role. The most startling claim made about it is that reflection can destroy knowledge, and in particular ethical knowledge. Indeed, reflection has destroyed at least some ethical knowledge. It does not destroy in order to rebuild: we cannot, by further reflection, acquire new ethical knowledge to replace what we have lost. For when reflection becomes philosophical, it reveals that it cannot provide a secure foundation for ethics. Ethical knowledge can be built neither on the requirements of practical reason, nor on any account of human nature, nor on any other basis attainable through reflective thought.
We cannot avoid these ravages by avoiding reflection itself. For one thing it is too late: much ethical knowledge has already gone, and ceasing to reflect will not bring it back. For another, there is no route back from reflection: there are strategies to reduce it, but the costs of any substantial reduction are high, not least in honesty to ourselves.
Williams thinks, however, that some ethical knowledge may survive reflection, and also that we do not have to support ethical life through thinking that we have knowledge of our values. We can in some circumstances have confidence without knowledge. In favourable circumstances, such confidence can survive reflection, but is not attained by it. People have it when social conditions are propitious, and they lead ethical lives that are sustained by those conditions.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- World, Mind, and EthicsEssays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, pp. 156 - 169Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1995
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