Trade policymaking touches on many different aspects of politics. Chapter 3's theory of political support emphasized the distributional side of policy – protection benefits some and harms others. Politicians balance these interests when setting the tariff.

Chapter 4 examined an administrative side of politics, the problem of revenue collection. I argued that exogenous revenue constraints had modest effects on tariff-making in the population of countries. More important were endogenous, politically chosen revenue needs that logically preceded the political choice to rely on tariffs instead of other revenue sources. So defined, these revenue needs may be seen in many countries, and even more often in the rhetoric of politicians. They reflect distributional concerns connected to the theory of political support.

This chapter turns to a third aspect of domestic politics, the question of political institutions. Politicians seek political support in a wide range of institutional contexts. Although this book focuses primarily on politicians' willingness to supply protection, some changes to the demand side will affect these calculations. Changes in electoral institutions, for example, will affect the relative strength of the various groups in a country.