Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-848d4c4894-8bljj Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-06T09:02:03.477Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

12 - Rationality and Want-Satisfaction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 February 2010

Marc Fleurbaey
Affiliation:
Université de Paris V
Maurice Salles
Affiliation:
Université de Caen, France
John A. Weymark
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, Tennessee
Get access

Summary

Introduction

The proposition that I wish to defend in this chapter is that the satisfaction of wants is in general good. More precisely, I argue that this proposition is not vulnerable to two objections against it that are quite commonly made and widely regarded as decisive. Both objections turn on the way in which wants are formed. According to one, the satisfaction of wants is compromised by the phenomenon of adaptive preference formation: We tend to want what we can get and not what we cannot. According to the other, the proposition that want-satisfaction has value commits us to the counterintuitive claim that everybody must, on pain of irrationality, work to create in themselves (and in others for whom they are responsible) wants that are easily satisfied. I take the canonical statements of these two objections to have been made by Jon Elster and John Rawls, respectively, and it is their versions that I shall discuss.

Between them, these two objections suggest that there are serious problems with the idea that want-satisfaction is valuable. If we let nature take its course, changes in our preferences will occur “behind our backs,” as Elster puts it, in such a way as to bring them in line with what is available, and this (he supposes) casts doubt on the value of getting what we want. But if we intervene self-consciously in the formation of our preferences, Rawls is telling us that we must deliberately try to do even more effectively exactly what (according to Elster) tends to happen anyway.

Type
Chapter
Information
Justice, Political Liberalism, and Utilitarianism
Themes from Harsanyi and Rawls
, pp. 281 - 300
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×