Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-7479d7b7d-8zxtt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-07-12T06:32:52.322Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

6 - Fiscal Gap Politics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Daniel N. Shaviro
Affiliation:
New York University
Get access

Summary

Buzz: We're going to have us some real kicks. Little chickie-run. You been on chickie-runs before?

Jim: Sure – that's all I ever do.

– From Rebel Without a Cause

Less! Bread! More! Taxes!

– Crowd in Lewis Carroll, Sylvie and Bruno

Mr. President, I'm not saying we wouldn't get our hair mussed. But I do say … no more than ten to twenty million killed, tops. Uh … depending on the breaks.

– General Turgidson, in Stanley Kubrick's Doctor Strangelove

There can be no serious doubt that our current budgetary policy path places us at needless risk of a major fiscal meltdown. It remains unclear, however, whether such a “hard landing” is more likely or less likely than a scenario in which revenues and outlays adjust sooner and more gradually. This is in large part a question about our political system and its capacity to yield mature and responsible policy decisions.

To understand the politics of narrowing the fiscal gap, a lot more is needed than just denunciation of the last few years of federal budgetary policy. I see the needed analysis as having five stages. First, what were the politics of creating the fiscal gap? Second, what led to the political consensus from 1982 through 2000 that favored deficit reduction and thus – however imperfectly, given the flaws in the measure – a narrowing of the fiscal gap? Third, why did that consensus collapse?

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2006

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Fiscal Gap Politics
  • Daniel N. Shaviro, New York University
  • Book: Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March towards Bankruptcy
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511618253.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Fiscal Gap Politics
  • Daniel N. Shaviro, New York University
  • Book: Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March towards Bankruptcy
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511618253.008
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Fiscal Gap Politics
  • Daniel N. Shaviro, New York University
  • Book: Taxes, Spending, and the U.S. Government's March towards Bankruptcy
  • Online publication: 18 December 2009
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511618253.008
Available formats
×