Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- PREFACE
- Map 1
- Map 2
- U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAZIS
- INTRODUCTION
- SECTION ONE ESPIONAGE AND GENOCIDE
- 1 OSS Knowledge of the Holocaust
- 2 Other Responses to the Holocaust
- 3 Case Studies of Genocide
- 4 Nazi Espionage: The Abwehr and SD Foreign Intelligence
- 5 Follow the Money
- 6 The Gestapo
- SECTION TWO COLLABORATION AND COLLABORATORS
- SECTION THREE POSTWAR INTELLIGENCE USE OF WAR CRIMINALS
- CONCLUSION
- APPENDIX: Western Communications Intelligence Systems and the Holocaust
- TERMS AND ACRONYMS
- SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
- RECORD GROUPS CITED
- CONTRIBUTORS
- INDEX
2 - Other Responses to the Holocaust
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- PREFACE
- Map 1
- Map 2
- U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE NAZIS
- INTRODUCTION
- SECTION ONE ESPIONAGE AND GENOCIDE
- 1 OSS Knowledge of the Holocaust
- 2 Other Responses to the Holocaust
- 3 Case Studies of Genocide
- 4 Nazi Espionage: The Abwehr and SD Foreign Intelligence
- 5 Follow the Money
- 6 The Gestapo
- SECTION TWO COLLABORATION AND COLLABORATORS
- SECTION THREE POSTWAR INTELLIGENCE USE OF WAR CRIMINALS
- CONCLUSION
- APPENDIX: Western Communications Intelligence Systems and the Holocaust
- TERMS AND ACRONYMS
- SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
- RECORD GROUPS CITED
- CONTRIBUTORS
- INDEX
Summary
The first official recognition that Nazi Germany was pursuing a war of extermination against the Jews—the Allied Declaration of December 17, 1942— generated public and media criticism that Britain and the United States were not doing anything to halt the slaughter. During a late March 1943 trip to the United States, British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden engaged in preliminary discussions in preparation for a joint American-British conference on refugee problems. This conference, scheduled to take place in Bermuda in April 1943, was arranged in part to show that the two governments were working on saving lives.
The State Department and the Bermuda Conference
Rabbi Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress and Joseph M. Proskauer of the American Jewish Committee met with Eden while he was in the United States and asked him for an Allied declaration calling upon Hitler to permit Jews to leave Nazi-occupied Europe. Eden rejected this idea as “fantastically impossible,” also repudiating their hope of shipping food to starving Jews in Europe. In a meeting later that day with high State Department officials, Eden warned that Hitler might take the Allies up on an appeal to release large numbers of Jews, and that there were not enough ships and means of transportation in the world to handle them. (German U-boats, in fact, were destroying Allied ships in the Atlantic faster than new ships could be built: an Allied invasion of North Africa in the fall of 1942 suffered from insufficient shipping.)
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- U.S. Intelligence and the Nazis , pp. 45 - 72Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2005