The unrestricted access to the air, a common pool resource, has generated global externalities. Air could be perceived as a public good where no subtractability applies (consumption of air by one person does not affect air consumption by the next person). This is not the case, however, when air quality rather than air quantity is at issue. Air quality is a common pool resource, as the use of the air by polluting industries and technologies diminishes the quality of air available for the average consumer.

With regard to long-range transboundary pollution, the issue of air quality has been addressed on a regional basis among a number of similarly developed countries. A robust regime has been established, therefore, in which there are low incentives for parties to defect.

The effectiveness of ozone regime and climate change regime is not that clear. This is because of the asymmetry between costs and benefits as they are distributed among countries with different priorities, as well as because of the scientific uncertainty and cooperation difficulties fueled by the different socioeconomic conditions of states. The ozone and climate change regimes would not have been articulated but for “side-payments,” in the form of additional funding and treaty exemptions, that developed countries agreed to concede to ensure developing countries' cooperation. This is a classic case of the application of the Kaldor-Hicks principle, in which the “winners” have chosen to compensate the “losers” to induce their participation.