INTRODUCTION

The so-called simulation theory of how we arrive at (some) judgements about others' thoughts is taken by many to be plausible. (See the volumes edited by Davies and Stone [1995a and 1995b] and by Carruthers and Smith [1996] for an introduction to the literature.) Goldman has contributed notably to this debate and also to the discussion of related questions (Goldman 1995, 2000a, 2000b). Among such related questions are these: Can the ideas invoked in the simulation theory of the heuristics of psychological judgements throw any light on our possession of psychological concepts? And can they throw any light on the nature of the mental? Goldman has trenchantly criticised one version of the idea that simulationism can help us in these areas (Goldman 1995). It may be that one could begin to muster some response to some of his objections (see Section 3 below), but I shall not be attempting to revive the kind of view which he attacks, since I share his scepticism about it. The purpose of this essay is, however, to suggest that there is another, and very different, way in which ‘simulationist’ ideas can be deployed to illuminate at least some aspects of our possession of psychological concepts. Whether this alternative approach has anything to offer on the nature of the mental itself is more obscure. I believe that it may, but will have only a little to say on this topic here.