Deciding about the truth of Christian beliefs so far seems to bring one of the trinitarian persons to the forefront – Jesus the Son – and to call for attention to the Father and the Spirit only as implicated in the distinctive epistemic work of Jesus Christ. Yet while the Son seems to have the leading role in a trinitarian response to the question of epistemic right, our christologically oriented answer to this question leaves another equally important matter largely untouched: how is it that we come to ascribe this epistemic role to the Son?

We recognize the ultimate epistemic right which belongs to Jesus Christ by organizing our total system of belief around the narratives which identify him, crucified and risen. If we ascribe this epistemic significance to Jesus, we shall be unwilling to hold true any belief which we recognize to be inconsistent with these narratives, and, conversely, unwilling to regard these narratives as false for the sake of holding true any other belief, should that belief conflict with them. Whence, though, comes this willingness to hold the narratives true in the face of whatever epistemic opposition the believer may encounter? How – without recourse to foundations or epistemic dependence – do we succeed in recognizing the epistemic ultimacy of Jesus the Son?

To this question the tradition has tended to respond by appealing to a distinctive epistemic role of the Holy Spirit: “No one can say ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except by the Holy Spirit” (I Cor. 12:3).