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FIVE - Conflict-of-Interest Legislation in the United States: Origins, Evolution, and Inter-Branch Differences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 October 2009

Bruce E. Cain
Affiliation:
Robson Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley; Director, University of California's Washington Center
Mark J. Oleszek
Affiliation:
Doctoral candidate in American politics, University of California at Berkeley
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Summary

If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

James Madison, Federalist No. 51

In an effort to oblige the United States government to control itself, the Framers of the Constitution divided its legislative, executive, and judicial responsibilities into three distinct but inter-related branches. James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, viewed men as instruments of their own desires, and this Hobbesian understanding of human nature was the dominant one among participants at the Constitutional Convention. In the Framers' view, if ambitions for power remained unchecked, then public officials would expand their powers at the expense of the public good. The constitutionally mandated separation of powers and the various requirements for cooperation in national policy making among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government were written into the Constitution to minimize concentrations of power and the potential for the misuse of public office.

The Framers also added several specific provisions to limit the potential for conflicts of interest to color decision making by elected officials. One provision bars federal officials from accepting gifts, employments, or titles from foreign governments.

Type
Chapter
Information
Conflict of Interest and Public Life
Cross-National Perspectives
, pp. 101 - 124
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2008

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