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2 - When the President Governs Alone: The Decretazo in Argentina, 1989–93

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

John M. Carey
Affiliation:
Washington University, St Louis
Matthew Soberg Shugart
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
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Summary

INTRODUCTION

President Carlos Saul Menem's tenure, which began in 1989 and is characterized by an increasing concentration of power in the executive branch, consummated in the adoption of a new constitution in 1994. Presidential expansion has not been effectively opposed by Congress, the judiciary, or other institutions. In some instances Congress itself has contributed to the concentration of power in the executive, by delegating legislative authority, for example, and by reorganizing the Supreme Court. The dominance of the Argentine president has been described as decretazo, or government by decree. What actually gave birth to the expression was the noteworthy increase in the president's use of so-called decretos de necesidad y urgencia (Need and Urgency Decrees, or NUDs). By this means the executive “passes” laws, usurping congressional law-making authority without consent. NUDs were not unknown in Argentina before Menem's presidency. Between 1853 and July 1989, approximately twenty-five NUDs were issued. Between July 1989 and August 1994, however, President Menem issued 336 NUDs. He created taxes, repealed congressional laws, and modified private contractual relations.

According to Argentine law until the constitutional reform of 1994, the president could issue three types of decrees:

  1. rule-making decrees in the course of implementing legislation

  2. autonomous decrees based on constitutionally endowed presidential powers

  3. legislative decrees based on authority delegated by Congress

The first two types of decrees correspond to what Carey and Shugart call “rule making,” and the third one corresponds to “delegated decree authority.”

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1998

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