Virtue occupies Smith's attention throughout the The Theory of Moral Sentiments and is the chief topic of an entire section (Part VI). Virtue is the “natural object of esteem, honour, and approbation”; it is that on which moral evaluation focuses (VII.i.2). “Virtue is excellence, something uncommonly great and beautiful” (I.i.5.6), and that excellence concerns primarily the perfection of self, though we also speak of virtuous or vicious action or conduct. Morality is to be understood primarily in terms of an ethics of character. In the course of an approving summary of Aristotle's ethical theory, Smith writes: “When we denominate a character generous or charitable, or virtuous in any respect, we mean to signify that the disposition expressed by each of those appellations is the usual and customary disposition of the person” (VII.ii.1.13). This, in turn, means that Smith must place significant weight on excellence of character, on the right “pitch” or “tenor” of the emotions, and on judgment. Smith is unusual, among modern moral philosophers, in according judgment so important a role.