subjecting corporations and corporate managers to greater and harsher criminal law will not produce the kind of deterrent effect that is generally assumed. In fact, our review suggests that criminalization may even backfire by producing hostility and resistence to law within firms. Recall that one of the key assumptions of a deterrence argument is that fear of punishment is what produces law-abiding behavior. If companies (or, more accurately, their personnel) do not fear, fail to consider, discount, or disparage formal legal sanctions, deterrence will not be achieved. Yet advocates of criminalization suggest that deterrence fails because of implementation deficiencies.

As this quotation illustrates, deterrence defenders recommend ratcheting up the amount of punishment instead of reconsidering how best to achieve corporate compliance. It has been difficult for policy makers, politicians, and the general public to step out of the “deterrence trap” – a step that is necessary to consider seriously alternative methods of crime control.