Financiers, it was once commonly believed on both the left and the extreme right, controlled or at least colluded with politicians. This particular demonology has been largely exorcized by recent research which has pried into the records, rather than relying upon prejudice and ideology. The greater subtlety of analysis is clearly shown in the paper by Hubert Bonin. Bankers might be divided, which gave politicians the opportunity for autonomy in decision-making; they might even go against the majority view. Where politicians did follow the advice of bankers, it cannot simply be assumed that it was the result of dependence: it might be a consensus based on a commonsense solution. After all, the protection of financial stability is not only in the interests of bankers but also of small traders and savers.

The two papers on Germany provide detailed substantiation of the complex and shifting balance between different interest groups. In Germany, the power of the banks seems to have been curtailed after the First World War, which marked the peak of the synthesis of the great banks and an autocratic-aristocratic state. Industry was emancipated from the banks which were obliged to mount a partially successful defensive strategy against the state. In the case of reparations and stabilization, it was the interests of industry rather than bankers which were dominant. After 1924, the power of the banks did increase in a situation of capital shortage but there is little sign that this was translated into political influence. In fact, the banks were in a precarious position because of their lending policy which was exposed in the depression, and they were susceptible to state regulation and intervention.