The first case study provides a good insight into the reverse adaptation of an electric utility. In the late 1970s and early 1980s a utility that had, as the result of active government support for more than fifty years, become a dam-building company and the primary agent of development in the Australian state of Tasmania ran into concerted opposition. The opposition came over the proposal to build a dam in a wilderness area, but the opponents also exposed a planning process that essentially involved the derivation of a demand forecast to justify the power scheme.

In October 1979 the Hydro Electric Commission of Tasmania (HEC) presented to the State Government a report recommending construction of a dam (the Gordon Below Franklin) on the Gordon River below its confluence with the Franklin River in the remote south-west wilderness area of the state. It was to be the first dam in an ‘Integrated Development’ program, to be followed by a second dam on the Franklin, through which would be diverted the waters of the King River, thus increasing the yield of both power stations.

This proposed dam was to divide opinion, both in Tasmania and on mainland Australia, and expose the inability of Tasmania's political institutions to resolve such conflicts. It led to the forced resignation of one minister, the toppling of the state's Premier by his party and the eventual loss of government by the Australian Labor Party. The resulting campaign to save the Franklin River came to dominate the political agenda in the state and, for a time, the Australian Commonwealth.