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8 - Negotiating the Transition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2009

Filip Reyntjens
Affiliation:
Universiteit Antwerpen, Belgium
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Summary

The Political Landscape

The Regime in Kinshasa

In Chapter 5, I discussed the nature of the Congolese regime, between Laurent Kabila's coming to power and the outbreak of the second war. Despite the new conflict and the occupation of more than half the national territory by rebel and foreign forces, the regime continued to attempt to institutionalise (in the sense indicated in the text later) its authoritarian rule. As will be seen, at the same time Kabila was blocking attempts to find a negotiated settlement to the military conflict. This dual attitude was inspired by one and the same consideration: giving in to demands for power-sharing by either or both the opposition forces and the rebel groups would have been a major threat to his position. Although there was no state worth mentioning and while half the national territory was outside government control, Kabila represented a sovereign legal entity recognised by the international community. This recognition of juridical, rather than empirical statehood, gave him an edge over his challengers, at least in the short run, and it allowed him to get away with an erratic mode of governance, which external partners, both African and more broadly international, disliked but were unable or unwilling to counter. It also allowed Kabila to ‘play state’ and to try to create the impression of institutional/legal normality.

A constitutional commission established in October 1997 thus adopted a draft constitution in March 1998, and a law-decree of 25 May 1998 provided for the creation of a Constituent and Legislative Assembly. The constitutional process was to be firmly controlled by the president, and the war only reinforced this tendency.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Great African War
Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996–2006
, pp. 232 - 278
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2009

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