ARISTOTLE'S ETHIC OF VIRTUE

In the preface to the first edition of his classic work on Aristotle's ethical theory, W. F. R. Hardie wrote, “In the study of Aristotle familiarity can be an obstacle to understanding; we are prone to think we know what he means before we do”. In the preceding chapters, I have examined some familiar but puzzling Aristotelian theses, especially his muchmaligned doctrine of the mean, from a less familiar perspective, arguing that Aristotle's ethics is primarily an ethic of virtue.

I have argued that the doctrine of the mean is of more interest and plays a larger role in Aristotle's ethics than has previously been thought. The doctrine of the mean combines three different aspects: (1) a doctrine of equilibrium, according to which the good human being has the emotions that are called for in a given situation; (2) a sophisticated view of the particulars of the situation; and (3) a triadic taxonomy of virtue and vices. The doctrine of the mean has substantive consequences. Aristotle's list of ethical virtues, including the important nameless ones, while quite controversial, is grounded in the doctrine of equilibrium. Moreover, the doctrine of equilibrium supports Aristotle's view that the ethical virtues are not essentially remedial, and is consistent with his claim that one cannot have one ethical virtue fully without having all the rest. The second aspect of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean enters into Aristotle's way of addressing moral dilemmas. Perhaps most surprisingly, the third aspect shows how Aristotle can reply to the immoralist, and it also contributes to Aristotle's views about democracy in the polis.