This chapter is written in support of an objectivist position in ethics. The first part of the chapter attempts to characterize the objectivism defended. And the second presents some arguments that should help to make the objectivism in question appealing.

I characterize ethical objectivism by three claims. First, semantic objectivism: the claim that ethical evaluations posit values – including, of course, disvalues – and do not serve just to express feelings or anything of that kind. Second, ontological objectivism: the claim that there really are ethical values available for evaluations to posit, so that evaluations are not undercut by massive error. And third, justificatory objectivism: the claim that, though ethical justification may not dictate a unique verdict in every case, the verdicts it delivers are equally relevant for every person; they are based on neutral values that have the same significance for all.

Having characterized ethical objectivism in this way, I go on to present some arguments in its defense. With each of the first two claims, I argue that the claim is inherently plausible and bolster this by showing that the main reason why opponents reject it is not compelling. In the case of the third claim, justificatory objectivism, I take a more direct approach. I present considerations that tend to undermine the opposing position, spending only a little time in defending the objectivistic alternative against attack.