Signs of a thaw in the British policy

At the beginning of 1926 it looked as if Anglo-Soviet relations had deteriorated beyond recovery. Chamberlain had been under constant pressure from the obdurate diehards to sever relations with Russia, while Chicherin manifested increasing animosity towards Britain. However, Chamberlain, aware of a move towards moderation in Moscow, refused to act hastily. Moreover, he realized that any hostile activity towards Russia would be interpreted in Germany as an attempt to drive a wedge between these countries; this might compromise Germany's entry to the League, which was vital for the pacification of Europe. Thus, although he did not ostensibly share Germany's contention that ‘Russia must be friends with somebody’, he had taken cautious steps to establish a more normal pattern of relations with Russia. These efforts were promptly frustrated by the outbreak of the general strike.

Ever since Locarno, the Russians had been obsessed by the idea that Chamberlain was contemplating the transformation of the treaty into an alliance against Russia. Typical of this obsession was their attribution of anti-Soviet articles written under the Pseudonym of ‘Augur’ by Poliakov, a White Russian, to none other than Chamberlain himself. Consequently they abandoned for a time their hopes of resuming negotiations in Britain. The only activities towards this end were pursued by Citrine on behalf of the General Council of the TUC. At the beginning of February he described to Chamberlain the economic advantages which he believed lay in trade with Russia.