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9 - The rejection of apocalyptic foreign policy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 October 2009

Steven C. A. Pincus
Affiliation:
University of Chicago
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Summary

Contrary to all expert predictions, however, the States General decided to send Jongstall and Nieupoort back to England, armed with fresh instructions. Hopes and expectations for peace soared. “Is it any wonder that I am fallen from my confidence that there will be no peace,” Edward Hyde whined to Edward Nicholas, “and can you ask me the reason, when you tell me your intelligence from England assures you that they will recede from all their extravagant propositions, and that that the people of Holland will grant anything [asked]?” What had precipitated such a dramatic change in the course of events?

Traditionally historians have explained this change by highlighting the conciliatory effect of Cromwell's private meetings with the Dutch deputies. Though there can be no doubt that Cromwell did meet with the Dutch deputies – especially with the republican Beverning – and that he spoke enthusiastically about what the Dutch and English could achieve together if allied, one should not overestimate his enthusiasm for peace without security before the autumn of 1653. In the much-discussed conferences with Beverning in St. James's Park, Cromwell expressed his “opinion that there must be one supreme authority to have the direction of all matters relating to the strict union for mutual defense of both states against all external enemies.” To Beverning's protestations that such an alliance would invalidate all other Dutch treaties, Cromwell mockingly replied that the Dutch were willing to cast aside their French allies at Munster in 1648.

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Chapter
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Protestantism and Patriotism
Ideologies and the Making of English Foreign Policy, 1650–1668
, pp. 149 - 167
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1996

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