Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-68945f75b7-jtc8j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-09-03T11:13:44.806Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

6 - Power and organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 September 2009

Get access

Summary

The previous chapter opened with two quotes from Frederick Hayek on the problems of consolidating information from a multitude of sources. No system of coordinating human behavior into a coherent whole can proceed without mechanisms for gathering information on what is and dispersing information to others about what to do. Hayek and many others have concluded that the mechanism best able to do this is the market. Relative prices are summary statistics carrying an astonishing amount of information about market demands, costs, and technology. Indeed, the logic expressed in formal microtheory models leads to the unavoidable conclusion that markets are the most efficient means of structuring human effort. Decentralized decisions in response to these prices is proven to lead “as if by an invisible hand” to a socially optimal outcome.

That leaves a perplexing question, however. If markets are clearly better than all other alternatives, then why are they so little used? Most of the production in this world takes place under a system of administrative authority with hierarchical patterns of control. Goods may ultimately reach a market, but only after extended stays in organizations in which human behavior is coordinated by administration. This fact is often obscured in the specified drama of economic theory in which one important category of actors consists of business “firms,” usually discussed as if they were individual entrepreneurs.

Type
Chapter
Information
Economics and Power
An Inquiry into Human Relations and Markets
, pp. 102 - 120
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 1989

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×