6 - HIGHER ORDER THEORIES
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2009
Summary
Higher order, or HO, theories of consciousness claim to give a naturalistic explanation of the difference between conscious and unconscious occurrences. These theories present two kinds of challenge to QER. On the one hand, they provide positive accounts of consciousness, and a fortiori of phenomenal consciousness, that are incompatible with QER. On the other hand, HO theories also offer arguments that, if sound, would undercut the key claim that phenomenal qualities can occur only in episodes of consciousness. These two kinds of challenge are closely related and cannot be considered in complete isolation from each other. Roughly speaking, however, I will begin with the first and move on to the second in the section titled “Unconscious Pains and Tastes?”.
To introduce HO theories, let us consider cases in which people rely on assumptions without realizing it. They take in some information and they pronounce a conclusion, where the conclusion would not be rationally connected with what they took in unless a further assumption were being made. But they did not utter that assumption, either overtly or subvocally. If advised of the dependence of their conclusion on the assumption, they might deny that they relied on it and even deny its truth; and these denials might be made with every feeling of sincerity. In cases of this kind, it would be natural to say that the assumption was made unconsciously.
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- Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness , pp. 87 - 106Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2004