Contrary to popular ideas, army commanders-in-chief and more junior corps commanders enjoyed considerable autonomy in the day-to-day management of the forces under their command throughout the reign of Louis XIV. There is certainly some truth in the traditional argument that Louvois sought to gain prescriptive control over all aspects of campaigning, either through the intendants d'armée and commissaires des guerres or through overbearing pressure on the generals. But, as part I of this book made clear, the attempt to use the intendants to control the generals had only a very limited effect, while Louvois himself – never mind Michel Le Tellier or Barbezieux – was anxious to build up a network of supporters within the high command on whom he could rely and who would not, therefore, have to be bullied. Moreover, it is far from clear that the king shared the extreme need felt by Louvois to micro-manage the French war effort. Indeed, Louis XIV was all too aware that he was not omniscient – the royal gaze might be seen throughout the kingdom by his subjects but that did not mean he could see very much himself. In the case of the army, Louis found – and here his generals agreed with him – that military affairs could be best coordinated when the king was at court rather than in the field in person.