The topic of this volume is one aspect of a broader issue, which is the capture of the laws of property by interests that can benefit from them. Individual property rights have intrinsic social value because they can civilize self-interest by forcing it to serve the public good. This phenomenon provides escape from “the tragedy of the commons” by preserving natural resources, and it also makes innovation possible. Because information constitutes a “natural commons,” the production of valuable information goods could fail to attract investment without property rights. Since innovation is the turning of information into concrete reality, if copying could not be prevented, there would be little information worth copying and little innovation.

However, the fruitful harmony between private interest and public good that property rights can deliver is inherently unstable. Those who are forced to promote the public good with what they own readily learn how to escape such constraints. They do this by gaining control of the relevant property laws and reshaping them to advance their private interests. Indeed, because property laws are always under threat of corruption in this way, John Stuart Mill could rightly note that “the laws of property have never yet conformed to the principles on which the institution of private property rests.”

The ability of property owners to influence legislation has accelerated greatly during the last century, a trend that was noted as early as 1962 by Buchanan and Tullock in their famous book “The Calculus of Consent:”