The most striking element that emerges from the analysis of the pension reforms presented in the previous three chapters is perhaps the fact that policy change has occurred in each of the three countries covered. This is in spite of a generalised concern among commentators about the alleged inability of continental European countries to undertake structural reform in the broad areas of social and economic policy. Even countries like France and Switzerland, which are generally depicted as some of the most reluctant to adapt their post-war welfare states to new international and domestic constraints, have managed to secure the adoption of unpopular retrenchment measures. These, although limited, can be seen as a first step towards a more comprehensive recasting of their respective pension systems. Perhaps, after all, the continental European welfare states are not as frozen as is generally thought (see also Taylor-Gooby 1996).

Policy change has occurred in the three countries covered by this study. Their governments, however, have used different strategies to secure the adoption of typically unpopular pension reforms. In particular, in Switzerland and on one occasion in France (1993), governments have dealt with the political difficulties associated with retrenchment by designing reform packages which included elements that had been previously demanded by key potential opponents of reform. To some extent, through the inclusion of these quid pro quos, they have managed to neutralise the effect of those veto points that exist in their political systems. In contrast, in the two other instances reviewed, the 1986 British reform and the 1995 failed attempt in France, legislation did not include similar concessions targeted on pro-welfare groups.