The extent and nature of his indebtedness to Hegel are perhaps the most fiercely contested issues in Marx scholarship. However, despite widespread and bitter disagreement concerning the subsequent development of Marx's thought, the ‘Hegelian’ character of the early writings is usually treated as incontrovertible. The assumption that it is Hegel who provides the predominant influence on the work of the young Marx is shared by proponents of both the ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ accounts of his overall intellectual evolution. Indeed, the purported Hegelianism of Marx's early writings frequently provides the reference point against which these very notions of ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ are defined and defended. The literature typically canvasses only two interpretative possibilities – either Marx ceased to be a Hegelian, or he did not cease to be a Hegelian.

I regard this overwhelming consensus about the Hegelian character of the early writings with a degree of scepticism. Not least, its foundations look problematic. It is typically built on two tempting but contestable interpretative tendencies: the first is to treat German philosophy as the only significant influence on the young Marx; the second is to treat Hegel as if he constituted the entirety (as opposed to a part) of German philosophy. I have tried to resist both of these interpretative temptations in the present work, acknowledging the diversity, not only of German philosophy, but also of other possible influences on the young Marx.