Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. ‘Causality and determination’. In Causation and Conditionals, ed. Ernest Sosa. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House

Armstrong, D. M. 1978. A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1989a. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1989b. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1991. ‘What makes induction rational?’ Dialogue (Canada), 30: 503–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1999a. ‘The causal theory of properties: properties according to Shoemaker, Ellis, and others’. Philosophical Topics, 26: 25–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 1999b. ‘A naturalist program: epistemology and ontology’. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 73.2: 77–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 2004. ‘How do particulars stand to universals?’ In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman, 139–154

Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B. and Place, U. T. 1996. Dispositions: A Debate, ed. Tim Crane. London: Routledge

Baxter, Donald. 2001. ‘Instantiation as partial identity’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 449–64Google Scholar

Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Bergmann, Gustav 1992. New Foundations of Ontology, ed. W. Heald. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Bigelow, John. 1988. The Reality of Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Campbell, Keith. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Cox, Damian. 1997. ‘The trouble with truth-makers’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 45–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Davidson, Donald. 1995. ‘Law and cause’. Dialectica, 49: 265–79Google Scholar

Demos, Raphael. 1917. ‘A discussion of certain types of negative propositions’. Mind, 26: 188–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dowe, Phil. 2000. Physical Causation. New York: Cambridge University Press

Ellis, Brian. 1999. ‘Response to David Armstrong’. In Causation and Laws of Nature, ed. Howard Sankey. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 39– 43

Ellis, Brian 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Fales, Evan. 1990. Causation and Universals. London: Routledge

Forrest, Peter and Armstrong, D. M. 1987. ‘The nature of number’. Philosophical Papers, 16: 165–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Forrest, Peter and Khlentzos, Drew. 2000, eds. Truth Maker and Its Variants. Special issue of Logique et Analyse, nos. 169–70

Foster, John. 1983. ‘Induction, explanation and natural necessity’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83: 87–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2002. Reckoning with Risk. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. (Published in the USA as Calculated Risk.)

Hager, Paul. 1994. Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Hamming, R. W. 1980 ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’. American Mathematical Monthly, 87.2.Google Scholar

Hegel, G. W. F. 1956 [1840]. The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree. New York: Dover

Heil, John. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press

Hellman, Geoffrey. 1989. Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Hochberg, Herbert. 1984. ‘Universals, particulars, and predication’. Logic, Ontology, and Language, 263–78. Munich: Philosophia Verlag

Hochberg, Herbert 1999. Complexes and Consciousness. Stockholm: Thales

Hochberg, Herbert 2001. The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Camap and Logical Realism. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi

Holton, Richard. 1999. ‘Dispositions all the way round’. Analysis, 59: 9–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Horwich, Paul. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Horwich, Paul Forthcoming. ‘Une critique de la théorie des vérifacteurs’. In La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, État de Choses, ed. Jean-Maurice Monnoyer. Paris: Vrin

Hume, David. 1960 [1739]. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Johnson, W. E. 1964 [1924]. Logic, Part III. New York: Dover

Kanigel, Robert. 1992. The Man who Knew Infinity. London: Abacus

Kirkham, Richard L. 1992. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books

Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Lewis, David 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Lewis, David 2001. ‘Truth-making and difference-making’. Noûs, 35: 602–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Lewis, David 2004. ‘Void and object’. In Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. John Collins, Ned Hall and L. A. Paul, ch. 10. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

Lycan, William G. 2001. ‘Moore against the new skeptics’. Philosophical Studies, 103: 35–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Martin, C. B. 1993. ‘Power for realists’. In Ontology, Causality and Mind, ed. John Bacon, Keith Campbell and Lloyd Reinhardt, 175–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Martin, C. B. 1996. ‘How it is: entities, absences and voids’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 57–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Martin, C. B. 1997. ‘On the need for properties: the road to Pythagoreanism and back’. Synthèse, 112: 193–231CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Molnar, George. 2000. ‘Truthmakers for negative truths’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 72–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Molnar, George 2003. Powers, ed. Stephen Mumford. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter and Smith, Barry. 1984. ‘Truth-makers’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287–321CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Plato. 1961. The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns. New York: Bolligen Foundation

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. ‘Mathematics without foundations’. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Quine, W. V. 1966. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York: Random House

Read, Stephen. 2000. ‘Truthmakers and the disjunction thesis’. Mind, 109: 67–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Restall, Greg. 1995. ‘What truthmakers can do for you’. Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University, Canberra

Restall, Greg 1996. ‘Truthmakers, entailment and necessity’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 331–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 1997. ‘There might be nothing: the subtraction argument improved’. Analysis, 57: 159–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Rosen, Gideon. 1995. ‘Armstrong on classes as states of affairs’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 613–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Russell, Bertrand. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1959. My Philosophical Development. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1972 [1918]. Russell's Logical Atomism, ed. David Pears. London: Fontana

Russell, Bertrand, and Whitehead, Alfred North. Principia Mathematica, vol. 1, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949

Shapiro, Stewart. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney. 1980. ‘Properties, causation and projectibility’. In Applications of Inductive Logic, ed. L. J. Cohen and Mary Hesse. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney 1984. ‘Causality and properties’. Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney 1998. ‘Causal and metaphysical necessity’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79: 59–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Simons, Peter. 1994. ‘Particulars in particular clothing: three trope theories of substance’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 553–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Sorensen, Roy. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Swinburne, Richard. 1980. ‘Properties, causation and projectibility: reply to Shoemaker’. In Applications of Inductive Logic, ed. L. J. Cohen and Mary Hesse. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Tooley, Michael. 1997. Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Twain, Mark, 1962 [1883]. Life on the Mississippi. Oxford: Oxford University Press

van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press

van Inwagen, Peter. 1996. ‘It is wrong, everywhere, always, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. In Faith, Freedom and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard. Rowman and Littlefield

Wigner, Eugene. 1960. ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences’. Communication in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13.1: 1–14Google Scholar

Williams, Donald C. 1966. Principles of Empirical Realism. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas

Williams, Michael. 2002. ‘On some critics of deflationism’. In What is Truth? ed. Richard Schantz, 146–58. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1961 [1921]. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Anscombe, G. E. M. 1975. ‘Causality and determination’. In Causation and Conditionals, ed. Ernest Sosa. Oxford Readings in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House

Armstrong, D. M. 1978. A Theory of Universals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1983. What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1989a. A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1989b. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1991. ‘What makes induction rational?’ Dialogue (Canada), 30: 503–11CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Armstrong, D. M. 1999a. ‘The causal theory of properties: properties according to Shoemaker, Ellis, and others’. Philosophical Topics, 26: 25–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 1999b. ‘A naturalist program: epistemology and ontology’. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 73.2: 77–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Armstrong, D. M. 2004. ‘How do particulars stand to universals?’ In Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman, 139–154

Armstrong, D. M., Martin, C. B. and Place, U. T. 1996. Dispositions: A Debate, ed. Tim Crane. London: Routledge

Baxter, Donald. 2001. ‘Instantiation as partial identity’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 449–64Google Scholar

Bergmann, Gustav. 1967. Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Bergmann, Gustav 1992. New Foundations of Ontology, ed. W. Heald. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press

Bigelow, John. 1988. The Reality of Numbers. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Campbell, Keith. 1990. Abstract Particulars. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Cox, Damian. 1997. ‘The trouble with truth-makers’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 45–62CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Davidson, Donald. 1995. ‘Law and cause’. Dialectica, 49: 265–79Google Scholar

Demos, Raphael. 1917. ‘A discussion of certain types of negative propositions’. Mind, 26: 188–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Dowe, Phil. 2000. Physical Causation. New York: Cambridge University Press

Ellis, Brian. 1999. ‘Response to David Armstrong’. In Causation and Laws of Nature, ed. Howard Sankey. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 39– 43

Ellis, Brian 2001. Scientific Essentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Fales, Evan. 1990. Causation and Universals. London: Routledge

Forrest, Peter and Armstrong, D. M. 1987. ‘The nature of number’. Philosophical Papers, 16: 165–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Forrest, Peter and Khlentzos, Drew. 2000, eds. Truth Maker and Its Variants. Special issue of Logique et Analyse, nos. 169–70

Foster, John. 1983. ‘Induction, explanation and natural necessity’. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 83: 87–101CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2002. Reckoning with Risk. London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. (Published in the USA as Calculated Risk.)

Hager, Paul. 1994. Continuity and Change in the Development of Russell's Philosophy. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers

Hamming, R. W. 1980 ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’. American Mathematical Monthly, 87.2.Google Scholar

Hegel, G. W. F. 1956 [1840]. The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree. New York: Dover

Heil, John. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press

Hellman, Geoffrey. 1989. Mathematics without Numbers: Towards a Modal-Structural Interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Hochberg, Herbert. 1984. ‘Universals, particulars, and predication’. Logic, Ontology, and Language, 263–78. Munich: Philosophia Verlag

Hochberg, Herbert 1999. Complexes and Consciousness. Stockholm: Thales

Hochberg, Herbert 2001. The Positivist and the Ontologist: Bergmann, Camap and Logical Realism. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi

Holton, Richard. 1999. ‘Dispositions all the way round’. Analysis, 59: 9–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Horwich, Paul. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Horwich, Paul Forthcoming. ‘Une critique de la théorie des vérifacteurs’. In La Structure du Monde: Objets, Propriétés, État de Choses, ed. Jean-Maurice Monnoyer. Paris: Vrin

Hume, David. 1960 [1739]. A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Johnson, W. E. 1964 [1924]. Logic, Part III. New York: Dover

Kanigel, Robert. 1992. The Man who Knew Infinity. London: Abacus

Kirkham, Richard L. 1992. Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford Books

Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Lewis, David 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Lewis, David 2001. ‘Truth-making and difference-making’. Noûs, 35: 602–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Lewis, David 2004. ‘Void and object’. In Causation and Counterfactuals, ed. John Collins, Ned Hall and L. A. Paul, ch. 10. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press

Lycan, William G. 2001. ‘Moore against the new skeptics’. Philosophical Studies, 103: 35–53CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Martin, C. B. 1993. ‘Power for realists’. In Ontology, Causality and Mind, ed. John Bacon, Keith Campbell and Lloyd Reinhardt, 175–94. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Martin, C. B. 1996. ‘How it is: entities, absences and voids’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 57–65CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Martin, C. B. 1997. ‘On the need for properties: the road to Pythagoreanism and back’. Synthèse, 112: 193–231CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Molnar, George. 2000. ‘Truthmakers for negative truths’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 72–86CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Molnar, George 2003. Powers, ed. Stephen Mumford. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter and Smith, Barry. 1984. ‘Truth-makers’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287–321CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Plantinga, Alvin. 1974. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Plato. 1961. The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntingdon Cairns. New York: Bolligen Foundation

Putnam, Hilary. 1975. ‘Mathematics without foundations’. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Quine, W. V. 1966. The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. New York: Random House

Read, Stephen. 2000. ‘Truthmakers and the disjunction thesis’. Mind, 109: 67–79CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Restall, Greg. 1995. ‘What truthmakers can do for you’. Automated Reasoning Project, Australian National University, Canberra

Restall, Greg 1996. ‘Truthmakers, entailment and necessity’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 331–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 1997. ‘There might be nothing: the subtraction argument improved’. Analysis, 57: 159–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Rosen, Gideon. 1995. ‘Armstrong on classes as states of affairs’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73: 613–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Russell, Bertrand. 1940. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1959. My Philosophical Development. London: George Allen and Unwin

Russell, Bertrand 1972 [1918]. Russell's Logical Atomism, ed. David Pears. London: Fontana

Russell, Bertrand, and Whitehead, Alfred North. Principia Mathematica, vol. 1, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson, 1949

Shapiro, Stewart. 1997. Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology. New York: Oxford University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney. 1980. ‘Properties, causation and projectibility’. In Applications of Inductive Logic, ed. L. J. Cohen and Mary Hesse. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney 1984. ‘Causality and properties’. Identity, Cause and Mind: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Shoemaker, Sydney 1998. ‘Causal and metaphysical necessity’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79: 59–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Simons, Peter. 1994. ‘Particulars in particular clothing: three trope theories of substance’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 553–75CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Sorensen, Roy. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press

Swinburne, Richard. 1980. ‘Properties, causation and projectibility: reply to Shoemaker’. In Applications of Inductive Logic, ed. L. J. Cohen and Mary Hesse. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Tooley, Michael. 1997. Time, Tense, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Twain, Mark, 1962 [1883]. Life on the Mississippi. Oxford: Oxford University Press

van Fraassen, Bas C. 1989. Laws and Symmetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press

van Inwagen, Peter. 1996. ‘It is wrong, everywhere, always, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence’. In Faith, Freedom and Rationality, ed. Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard. Rowman and Littlefield

Wigner, Eugene. 1960. ‘The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences’. Communication in Pure and Applied Mathematics, 13.1: 1–14Google Scholar

Williams, Donald C. 1966. Principles of Empirical Realism. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas

Williams, Michael. 2002. ‘On some critics of deflationism’. In What is Truth? ed. Richard Schantz, 146–58. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1961 [1921]. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul