And I said, wanting to take a look at the argument (logos), ‘If belonging (to oikeion) is different from being like (to homoion), then we'd be saying something worth saying, so 222b5 it seems to me, Lysis and Menexenus, about what a friend (philos/philon) is; but if it's actually the case that they're the same thing, like (homoion) and belonging (oikeion), it's not easy to discard our previous argument (logos) to the effect that like was useless to like with respect to their likeness, and to concede that what is useless 222c1 is a friend (philon) strikes a false note. So are you prepared,’ I said, ‘since we're intoxicated with our argument, that we should agree to say that belonging is something different from being like?’

‘Yes, absolutely.’

‘Shall we then also lay it down that the good belongs [is oikeion] to everyone, and the bad is 222c5 alien [allotrion, sc. to everyone]? Or [shall we lay it down] that the bad belongs to the bad, to the good the good, and to the neither good nor bad the neither good nor bad?’

They both said it seemed to them like this, that each 222d1 belongs to each.