In the Phaedo even more than in the Meno, it is important to bear in mind that what we are calling “recollection” is actually a three-termed affair: it is a matter of x's being reminded by y of z; the term occupying the “y” position acquires importance in the Phaedo.

72–73: RECOLLECTION AGAIN

Socrates concludes the Cyclical Argument by saying that there really is such a thing as coming-to-life-again (ʾɑναβιώσκεσθαι): the living come-to-be from the dead and the souls of the dead continue to exist (72d8–10). The next argument is to have the same conclusion.

It is Cebes who sets it going by adverting to the Doctrine of Recollection, which, he says (72e2–3), Socrates has often propounded. The Theory of Forms is also presented as something often propounded by Socrates. But in the case of the Forms, we can see how the Theory is a natural extension of what Socrates had been saying in the Socratic dialogues, whereas Recollection is a drastic innovation.

As Cebes states it, it is that “learning for us is nothing but being-reminded {ʾανάμνησις}” (72e3–4). So learning isn't that for others. In the next clause (e4–5), he says that what we now recollect we must have learned at some prior time, and he adds (73a1–2) that this must have been before the soul was “in human form” (τᾷ ʾανθρωπίνῳ εἴδει).