EARLY ACTION AND RESULTS

Spanish preparation for war had been thorough in many respects. Intense diplomatic activity had improved Madrid's overall political position in relation to the Dutch, in terms of the attitude and commitments of other European powers. A series of rapidly-executed manoeuvres in 1620, in the Rhineland and the southwestern frontiers of the United Provinces, under the cover of the Habsburg alliance, along with the build-up of troops available to Spínola, put Spain into a strong position on land.

The situation at sea was less encouraging. The goings-on in the dockyards of Flanders had not escaped the notice of the Dutch, and immediately upon the expiry of the Truce, the States General ordered a blockade of Flemish ports. No fewer than twenty-nine vessels – more than half their total naval strength – participated in this exercise in the summer of 1621. The inability of the Flanders armada to respond effectively to the challenge is illustrated by the fact that within two years the Dutch were actually able to reduce the size of their blockading force. The voracious onslaught on Dutch trade, schemed by Semple and others, expected in Madrid and feared in Amsterdam, simply did not materialise.

Some individual successes were more promising. The occasional lone raider escaped detection, and consequently a dribble of prize captures began to arrive at Dunkirk and Ostend.