Social media entered Myanmar during its most monumental political transition from decades-long and repressive military dictatorship to a burgeoning electoral democracy. During this seismic political shift, Myanmar has been plagued by optimism for a more open and wealthier society coupled with fear of uncertainties that naturally accompany any significant societal and political change. Social media has become the arena where such tension plays out in the most toxic way: it gives rise to nationalist right-wing activism, polarization and disinformation that accompanied offline communal violence with devastating results. Despite the initial high hopes that the expansion of internet and social media connectivity would positively contribute to the country's democratic transition, today Myanmar is the site of one of the world's worst humanitarian crises—dubbed the world's first “Facebook genocide”—as more than 700,000 Rohingya minorities have been displaced and thousands feared dead (Mozur 2018). Facebook was forced to admit it failed to stop the use of its platform to perpetuate hate speech and violence in Myanmar, particularly against the Rohingyas (Hatmaker 2018).

Yet there was initial hope among activists and opposition groups in the late 2000s that social media could be a force for progressive change. Many of the pro-democracy networks and civil society groups were established overseas, particularly in neighbouring Thailand, and had access to internet and social media long before it became widely available in Myanmar. They understood firsthand the power of digital media in facilitating social and political change—they had used these tools to help facilitate the “Saffron Revolution” in 2007. The “revolution” was sparked by a YouTube video of the former leader General Than Shwe's daughter's lavish wedding, among other factors.

As internet access expanded, social media became a space of toxicity rather than civility as the right-wing nationalist voices became influential, subverting much of the critical, more progressive voices. What makes Myanmar so vulnerable to online falsehoods and hate speech? Entrenched political polarization and systemic state violence against the Rohingya minorities may have provided structural conditions that facilitate communal violence. I argue in this chapter that social media has become a readily available tool for mobilization of radical voices in Myanmar partly because there was little state intervention to stymie such radicalization, and partly because the nascent activist groups that emerged online were deeply divided over the issue.