There are many conceivable models for shaping China's future political landscape. Western circles often speculate about a ‘third way’, one that will occupy the middle ground between today's autocratic system – Communist in name only – and Western parliamentary democracy. Opinions amongst Chinese thinkers are more pluralistic, and often more radical as well. Especially since the 19th Party Congress held in October 2017, many openly preach a ‘Chinese Model’ that opposes the West. It is hard to parse this wide-ranging discourse into neat trends. In his book China Goes Global, David Shambaugh distinguishes at least seven schools – a lot fewer than the hundred that existed, it is said, during China's Golden Age of philosophy (fifth century BCE), yet their existence does show the liveliness of the ongoing intellectual debate.

The most glaring difference is that between nationalists and internationalists. What connects the former group is the sense that China is a great, ancient, and unique country whose time has come to resume its legitimate role as a major superpower. According to this school, Western technologies and processes can contribute to the achievement of that goal, but cannot be allowed to change the essence of China. While the internationalists do not argue for a slavish imitation of Western liberalism per se, they do resist the chauvinist noises proclaiming Chinese culture to be of a unique and higher order. They are in favour of a convergence of East and West, and believe in the Doctrine of the Mean which was already advocated by Confucius. In the realm of economics, the nationalists argue for a large-scale nationalisation, viewing the privatisation of state businesses as the cause of the great income disparity and acute corruption that plagues present-day China. These excesses, according to the internationalists, cannot be fought by returning to the days of Mao's ‘iron rice bowl’ but by expanding Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms with political reforms, such as the separation of Party and state.