![](http://static.cambridge.org/content/id/urn:cambridge.org:id:book:9789048503926/resource/name/9789048503926i.jpg)
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Crisis Imperative
- 2 Crisis and Change
- 3 Comparing Social Security Crises:Design and Method
- 4 “Nothing as Permanent as a Temporary Arrangement”: Belgian Policy Making on Unemployment Benefits
- 5 Global Pacts and Crisis Plans
- 6 The Sticky State and the Dutch Disease
- 7 Crisis Narratives and Sweeping Reforms
- 8 The Politics of Crisis Construction
- Note
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Interview Respondents
- Bibliography
- Index
6 - The Sticky State and the Dutch Disease
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 January 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgments
- 1 The Crisis Imperative
- 2 Crisis and Change
- 3 Comparing Social Security Crises:Design and Method
- 4 “Nothing as Permanent as a Temporary Arrangement”: Belgian Policy Making on Unemployment Benefits
- 5 Global Pacts and Crisis Plans
- 6 The Sticky State and the Dutch Disease
- 7 Crisis Narratives and Sweeping Reforms
- 8 The Politics of Crisis Construction
- Note
- List of Abbreviations
- List of Interview Respondents
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
Introduction
Within a few decades, the Netherlands had transformed itself from one of the smallest European welfare states to one of the largest (Cox 1993: 3-4). The crown on this welfare state consisted of a social security system that guaranteed all citizens a minimum income if they were unable to work. The single largest jewel on this crown was the 1976 law governing disability insurance (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 126; Andeweg and Irwin 2002). The disability insurance scheme, called wao (Wet op de Arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering), ensured income-related benefits to every employee unable to work due to sickness or impairment. The universal character of the disability insurance was unique in the Western world and neighboring countries praised its progressive and bold legislative design (Noordam 2001). However, the very elements that made the Dutch welfare state unique were almost abolished in the early 1990s.
Policy termination rarely occurs and is difficult to achieve. Policies are designed to last a long time. They include concessions on other fronts as well as investments in institutionalization. Termination involves brutal conflicts. Not all policymakers have the stomach to fight often powerful anti-reform coalitions (Bardach 1976). This was especially the case for policies that granted benefits that almost 10% of voters were directly dependent on. Green-Pedersen (2002) claimed that disability benefit programs were more difficult to retrench than benefits for the unemployed, for whom it can be said have some agency in their situations. The disabled, on the other hand, do not have a hand in their fate, which makes cut backs in this area very difficult and unpopular. And yet, in April 1991, the Dutch minister of social affairs proposed exactly this, the abolition of the very popular disability insurance program. This strategy would have meant a major overhaul of the disability insurance plan, mass public protests, unprecedented media attention for social policy and an electoral disaster in the next election. Although the policy as a whole was not scrapped, major retrenchments that no one could have anticipated did eventually happen (Green-Pedersen 2002).
This case study tries to grapple with the question of why the Dutch government engaged in enforcing drastic changes and how it succeeded in making cut backs in such a popular program. As in Belgium, the problem pressure on the system increased in the Netherlands in the early 1990s.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- The Crisis ImperativeCrisis Rhetoric and Welfare State Reform in Belgium and the Netherlands in the Early 1990s, pp. 119 - 146Publisher: Amsterdam University PressPrint publication year: 2005