THIS BOOK EXAMINES the evolving strategy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) toward the South China Sea (SCS). In addition to long-standing territorial disputes over the islands and waters of the SCS, the PRC and the other claimant governments - Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Taiwan - have growing and often mutually exclusive interests over the region's offshore energy reserves and fishing grounds.

Meanwhile, many other countries outside of the region worry about the protection of sea lines of communication (SLOC) for military and commercial traffic - oil tankers in particular. These differences have been reflected in the increasing frequency and intensity of maritime incidents, involving both naval and civilian vessels, sometimes working in coordination against an opponent's naval or civilian targets.

This book has endeavored to provide a comprehensive history of the SCS conflict and lay out the stakes for each of the bordering states, including focused chapters on Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, and Taiwan. It also examines the U.S. government's role as the maritime arbiter in the region.

Each chapter on the various claimant states offers an in-depth overview of that state's territorial claims to the islands and waters of the SCS, its primary economic and military interests in these areas, its views on the sovereignty disputes over the entire sea, its strategy to achieve its objectives, and its views on the U.S. involvement in any of these issues.

The conclusions consider four different strategic scenarios - indirect, unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral - that might impact the future of this highly volatile region. With the almost daily changes occurring throughout the SCS, however, any scenario is mere speculation.

Supporting the main text is a detailed Timeline of SCS events, commencing in the second century B.C.E. and continuing up to the present period. Twenty-two supporting documents, referenced in the text, appear in the appendices.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author would like to thank all those former naval officers who shared their insights and expertise during personal, telephone, and email interviews, including Joseph W. Prueher, Lyle Bien, Michael Mullen, and James P. Wisecup. At the NWC, I benefited from the support of Jeffrey A. Harley, Lewis Duncan, Phil Haun, and Timothy Schultz.