Awarded the Julian Corbett Prize for Research in Modern Naval History, University of London

The Royal Navy's importance to British victories during the Seven Years War, Britain's first global war of empire (1756–63), can hardly be overstated. Triumphs such as Quebec in 1759 and 1760 and Havana in 1762 are best described as amphibious operations. Indeed, as Richard Harding defines amphibious warfare in the eighteenth century as ‘a mode of action in which a military force, capable of being fully maintained at sea, is dispatched to accomplish specific objectives on enemy territory’, it is difficult to find a military action during the war that was not at least dependent upon naval power. Closer to home, the strategy of the Western Squadron is credited with both protecting colonial military operations and trade, and ending French naval power.

More particularly, as the Western Squadron could operate successfully only by maintaining the health of its men, stationed at sea for long periods, historians have credited the success of British imperial forces during the Seven Years War to the naval administration's procedure of sending out fresh provisions. Here, I re-examine the operation of the Western Squadron in the light of contemporary medical practice and theory. I begin by discussing the health of seamen and the obstacles to maintaining it within the context of the development of Western Squadron operations during the eighteenth century. I then focus on the health of the Squadron during the Seven Years War and especially on the effect fresh victuals had on rates of sickness. This examination demonstrates that the initiative of fresh provisions was provisional and precarious. The Sick and Hurt Board and the Admiralty recognized that the sending out of fresh provisions to the Western Squadron was no long-term solution to the problem of maintaining the health of seamen when at sea for extended periods of time. I conclude by examining the correspondence of the Sick and Hurt Board during the period of the Seven Years War, establishing that their medical research into cures and preventatives for scurvy other than fresh vegetables was not based on ignorance, but rather on the search for a cure achievable within the constraints imposed by ships at sea and the practical demands of naval administration.