Once it became clear that Sino-Soviet tensions had reached new heights, on 31 October 1968 President Johnson ordered that all air, naval and artillery bombardment of North Vietnam would end as of 1 November 1968. His stated goal was to open talks leading to a negotiated peace settlement, but arguably Johnson's real goal was to turn China and the USSR against each other even more. This plan worked. On 2 March 1969, conflict erupted along China's northern border with Russia. For a time, it even appeared this war might spread and perhaps even go nuclear. Although this did not happen, the Sino-Soviet war opened the door for the next American president, Richard M. Nixon, to begin the long process of opening diplomatic relations with China and turning the PRC against the USSR. Coincidentally, the U.S. Navy's Top Gun School also opened on 3 March 1969, just one day after the Sino-Soviet war erupted, since the previous goal of soaking up SAMs was no longer required.

In December 1966, the CIA reported Hanoi thought “the Vietnam war was a test case as to whether world communism would succeed or not.” President Johnson's strategy of tearing apart the Sino-Soviet alliance by focus ing on Soviet aid to North Vietnam worked perfectly, since all such aid had to transit through Chinese territory. Soaking up the maximum number of SAMs was critical for this plan to succeed. By February 1967, the CIA could report: “The internal turmoil in China with its anti-Soviet theme has greatly reduced the amount of Soviet aid reaching North Vietnam. The Soviets have tried to bypass the problem by transporting the material by air but lack suf ficient long-range planes to accomplish the task.”

As early as spring 1965, it became clear to the CIA that the way to play the USSR and China off each other was the delivery of military aid to North Vietnam. The U.S. bombing campaign sought to increase Soviet-Soviet tensions. The USSR soon began to feel trapped. Frustrated, during March 1965 one Soviet official even warned “that Communist China would be the only winner in the event of a miscalculation by either the US or the Soviet Union” (see Document 8).