The cross-border enforcement of civil and commercial judgments was addressed in the Treaty of Rome creating the European Economic Community, decades before that subject-matter was brought within the regulatory powers of the European Union. Its Article 220 mandated Member States to enter into negotiations to ensure the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments. This triggered a development that started with the Brussels Convention, an international convention between Member States outside the parameters of Community law but still subject to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, and that was both intensified and accelerated after the Community acquired the competence to legislate in this area by virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam. The uniform system for an exequatur procedure under the Brussels Convention was substantially streamlined by the Brussels I Regulation. Under its terms, the declaration of enforceability had to be issued upon the completion of certain formalities, without hearing the judgment debtor and without assessing refusal grounds which could only be examined upon appeal. But it was also quickly established that the journey should not end there. The Tampere Programme of 1999 called upon the Commission to further reduce the intermediate measures required to enable the recognition and enforcement of judgments. As a first step it was envisaged to completely abolish these intermediate procedures for titles in respect of small consumer or commercial claims and for certain judgments in the field of family litigation (e.g. on maintenance claims and visiting rights). This approach of a gradual abolition of exequatur became the leitmotiv for European legislative activities in the area of international procedural law until today. The European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (EEO) was designated as the pilot project for the direct enforceability of a decision in other Member States without any need for a declaration of enforceability there. The underlying rationale was that due to the uncontested nature of the claims in question, no controversy should arise in relation to the cross-border enforcement of decisions. However, somewhat ironically, the inclusion of default judgments where the defendant had not entered an appearance in the proceedings meant that the EEO also became applicable to situations that are rather sensitive in terms of having to ensure that the defendant was properly informed about these proceedings.